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HOMO LOQUENS: AN ETHOLOGICAL VIEW 
ERNST PULGRAM 
Language, it is generally agreed, is the property of man alone on 
this earth. ‘Animal language’ is a metaphorical term at best, 
referring to nothing more elaborate than a set of vocal signals that 
some animals can produce so as to establish contact with their 
fellows. The range of these signals is niirrow, and their distinctiveness 
,%ant. It is possible, indeed easy, to list exhaustively all the different 
utterances that even the most ‘arti.;ulate’ animal will ever produce 
in his life, and no member of the species will invent any new signals 
or utterances. But it is of course inconceivable to record or foretell 
the different utterances of one human in his lifetime, let alone Gose 
of the entire species. Animal signals serve to ammunce matters of 
simple, albeit often vital, import: the approach of an enemy, the 
staking out of a territorial claim (the singing of birds), the sole 
possession of food or of a mat{! henceforth imlcccscible to competi- 
tors, leadership over a group, and so forth.1) All such signals are of 
course species specific. They ue triggered by an attitude and a 
mood created by the animal’s present perceived surroundings. 
Animal language is made up, then, not of information symbols, but 
of mood signals.zj 
1) Jackdaws and Central America9 howling monkeys are reputed to have 
a comparatively tige inventory of distinct cries. The varied noises that a 
dolphin makes have recently been the object of investigation and conjsiture, 
but it is too early to tell what portion of them is meaningful, though the 
inteJQigence of the animal is evic%ntly great. Bees are said to employ an 
elaborate set of sign?ds, conveyed, however, by dancing and body gestures 
r*+Aar than by noises. 
L) For this reason a dog can be trained to obey commands like ‘Sit’ and 
‘Speak’. (Note the doglover’s anthropomorphic euphemism for ‘Bark’.) But 
he cannot ieam, as every child of coutse can, that tie phrase ‘Don’t . . .’ 
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In the behasior caUed speaking man is thus a peculiar and unique 
animal on earth. So he is also because of his brain, which is dis- 
tinguished from the analogous organs of other species by its marvel- 
lous complexity and efficiency, and which in fact allows man to 
operate with conceptual thought, to be a speaking creature. In 
other respects, man is biologically rather a generalized animal in 
that he can rely on no feature that equips him peculiarly and shapes 
his fate: he enjoys no great speed or strength, is not protected by a 
shell or carapace, bears no strong tooth or cl.rw. His brain is his 
only, but overpowering speci~alization : becaunt of it he has provided 
himself with extra-corporeal tools that more ::han make up for his 
physical shortcomings, and has become the most potent - since he 
is the most cunning and intelligent - predator. Clearly man’s 
faculty of speech too is a function of the superior cerebral equipment 
that evolution has bestowed upon him. Homo loquens is therefore 
no less suitable a. name for the species than is /zonto sapiens. 
Yet speech is behavior, and not, like the brain, an organ. Indeed 
the organs involved in speech production are only secondarily 
employed for talking; primarily they serve vital functirns: when 
the diaphragm, the lungs, trachea, larynx, mouth, nose, tongue, 
teeth, or the lips cease to perform normally, man’s physical existence 
is impaired or becomes terminated. And certainly the brain itself 
attends to numerous and crucial concerns besides facilitating 
speech. (It is not impossible, however, that various organs involved 
in speech production would be less nimble and less sensitive if they 
were not so employed.) Now if the brain is a portion of our inherit- 
ance that we come by simply because we are humans, is therefore 
speaking behavior also an innate endowment? But this question 
leads to the ‘more fundamental one wh:ch had better be answered 
first, namely, whether behavior can be innate at all, aud not merely 
acquired through a process of learning. 
Whether behavior patterns can indeed be innate, or instinctive, 
not only in animals but also in man, has been a much debated 
question for centuries. An affirmative and, to my mind, particularly 
persuasive argument has lately been advanced by ethology, a 
converts every command recognizable to Mm into a prohibition, I& would 
have to learn every injunction separately as a new signal, the notion of 
syntactically structured utterances that ccnsist of replaceable parts and 
occur in a certain order, being beyond his competence. 
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relatively recent branch of the life sciences, one of whose pioneers 
and most eminent practitioners is the Austrian naturalist Konrad 
Lorenz. Its thesis is perhaps summed up in the statement that 
‘human behavior, far from being determined by reason and cultural 
tradition alone, is still suljcct ?o all the laws prevailing in all 
phylogenetically adapted instinctive behavior’.s) Ethology has in 
its short life made a great impact upon both the biological and the 
social sciences, which it straddles and between which rt can build 
long-desired and strong bridges. Therefore it behooves the linguist 
also to examine what effect it may have upon his science. 
Given its fundamental tenets, ethology could not but strike a 
heavy blow against the cult of the ccnditioned reflex, the alpha and 
omega of a view of hurnan behavior that has its roots in Pavlov’s 
experiments with the salivating dog, and was laid down in Watson’s 
psychological doctrine called behaviorism.4) This school of psy- 
chology holds that all human behavior is to be described exclusively 
in terms of physiological r-sponses to e:rternal stimuli, and that 
explanations having recourse to unobservable mental activity must 
be avoided. The true scientific attitude requires, it is ass,erted, that 
operations with what cannot be observed must be rejected as 
unscientific. Although unadulterated behaviorfjm, after its heyday 
in the 1920’s. was rather short-lived, its infiuence was and still is 
enormous. To be sure, in the 1940’s and 1950’s few scholars sti’i 
fancied Watson’s implicit claim that he could, by manipulating .i 
baby’s or infa;lt’s reflexes, create just about any kind of adult he 
had a mind to. (Naturally, neither the world at large nor the 
laboratory could accede to providing the requisite experimental 
conditions, hence the case was never tested.) Few indeed were 
willing to regard man as nothing more than a bundle cf striped 
muscles receptive only to orders conveyed by ihe environment, 
virtually incapable of suscitating and spontaneously acting upon 
endogenous stimu.!i, and defenselessly buffeted and iit fact shaped 
by the winds and currents of the piece of world in which he lives.5 
8) Lorena 1967,229. 
4) Cf. Watson 1924. 
6) Cf. Lorenz 1967, 48: ‘The fact that the central nervous system does not 
need to wait for stimuli, like an electric bell with a push-button, before it 
can respond, but that it can itself produce stimuli which give a natural, 
physiological e @nation for the ‘spontaneous’ behavior of animals and 
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Yet we do not always render ourselves a clear account of the depth 
to which the theme of the conditioned reflex has invaded our 
thinking, how often ready reliance on reflex diverts us from re- 
flecting. (How linguistics Jn particular has been enthralled I shall 
discuss later.) And if we do not follow the Pavlovs and the Watsons 
in regarding man as an accidental nothing, we are nonetheless Tot 
dir&lined to think of hin as a gentle and noble and innocent 
creature at bottom, but olten rendered brutal and wicked, or at 
least naughty, by the pressures of an antagonistic and debasing 
environment. The attitude that the responsibility for doing wrong 
lies more often than not with society rather than with the individual, 
seems to resuscitate, quite unnecessarily and uselessly, Rousseau’s 
naive and, one should have hoped, long since enterred fallacy of 
man’s innate goodness corrupted by civilization. No such absolute 
position can be sound - nor of course can the opposite one, inflicted 
by our Gurrent mythology, that man is evil by nature and can be 
redeemed only by divine grace dispensed through institutionalized 
religion. If nature and nurture jointly make US what we are, the 
problem is to discover what in us and what of us, including our 
language behavicr, we owe to the one or the other. 
It is obvious that in a human psychology dominated by be- 
haviorism, or in any social science bent on extreme positivism, so 
impalpable an item as instinct, or innate behavior, cannot figure as 
part of the orthodoxy or even as a hypr,tnes;s. Yet wherever one 
turns in the animal world one comes inevitably upon patterns of 
behavior which are not due to the single specimen’s ontogenetic 
learning and experience, but to something that is phylogenetically 
programmed in him. Thus instinct may be defined as ‘the genetically 
determined pattern [or program] which informs an animal as to 
how to act ia a given situation’.s) When instinct governs, thought 
and intelligence (to the extent available in a given animal or a 
species) can be dispensed with or somehow bypassed in the nervous 
circuitry. 
humans, has found recognition only in the last decacles . . . The strength 
of the ideological prejudices involved was plainly shown by the heated and 
emotional debates that took pIace before the endogenous production of 
stimuli within the central nervous system became 2 fact generally recognized 
by the science of physiology’. 
6) Ardrey 1968,29. See also Tinbergen 1951. 
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To give just one example of innate programming, I may refer to 
that most puzrling and still unsolved problem of animal behavior, 
the homing instinct (of migratory birds, homing pigeons, green 
turtles, seals, salmons, eels, etc.). No amount of observation and 
experimentation has so far produced more than the essentially 
question-begging answer that instinctive rather than learned 
behavior is at work. If some say that homing pigeons and migratory 
birds find their way back to places where they have already been, 
and that they merely have a good sense of orientation,‘) no one can 
say the same of young eels who, having been hatched in the niiddlo 
of the Atlantic Ocean, migrate infallibly to the places, either on the 
European or the american shore, which their parents left for 
breeding, heading in directions and toward locations which they, 
the transparent larvae, had never before experienced and con- 
cerning which they could of course not have been informed by their 
parents, who in any event had died after accomplshing their 
business of propagation. And - to use an example of behavior other 
than homing - African weaver birds whose ancestors had over Iour 
generations been kept in laboratory captivitv LX! prevented from 
leading a normal life and from normal nesting, upon release into 
their natural surroundings unhesitatingly set about, without 
example or instruction, to fashion their characteristic globular 
nests woven of grass and fibres, which they suspended from a tree 
branch by means of a horsehair tied in the distinctive weaverbird 
knot.*) Purely environmentalist explanations of these enigmas have 
shown themselves inadequate or wrong. 
It is of course true that the animal which stands higher on the 
evolutionary ladder is less dependent upon instinct for his survival 
and that of his species. But even the highest animal so far brought 
forth by evolution, man (though he may yet turn out to be a not 
very successful evolutionary experiment, and exterminate himself), 
is still subject, ss especially the ethologists have established, to 
instinctive drives, though in him they may be strongly reduced in 
‘) Pigeons have been transported away from home, however, in sealed 
boxes and vans so that they could not possibly observe SW trip, and have 
been taken to a place they had never visited; yet they found tbeir way back 
unenin&. 
8) Cf. the experiments by Eugene Mar&, reported ?sy hrdrey 1967, 204. 
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number and in effectiveness, that is to say, may be sublin,ated by 
non-instinctive controls, 
The behaviorist anthro’pologist says: ‘. . . the immediate fore- 
runners of man would have been increasingly freed from the limiting 
effects of their krstinctual drives, so that by the time hominid [and 
human] status would have been attained, virtually the last vestiges 
of that instinctive system of drives would have disappeared’. ‘In 
the course of human evolution the power of instinctual drives has 
gradually withered away, until man has virtually lost all his 
instincts. If there remain any residues of instincts in man, they are, 
possibly, the automatic reaction to a sudden loud noise, and in the 
remaining instance to a sudden withdrawal of support; for the rest, 
man has no instincts’.s) 
The ethologist, however, affirms (as quoted above, over fn. 3) 
that human behavior, especially social behavior, is not uninfluenced 
by instincts; and a great deal more on the subject will be said later. 
Even man’s indulgent view of himself as a pretty good chap when 
it comes tsJ choosing intelhgently and discriminatingly the right 
and proper thing to do in an emergency, when calamity threatens, 
gets deflated: ‘Man can behave very decently in tight spots, 
provided they are of a kind that occurred often enough in the 
palaeolithic period to produce phylogenetically adapted social 
norms to deal with the situation ‘.le) Fortunately, if inevitably, the 
approximately thousand millennia of man’s existence on earth have 
engendered enough such social norms so as to assure ourselves that 
we are not always true to the forn ula homo horn&i lw~zcs ‘man is a 
wolf to man’.ir) Hence ethologists do not hold the simplistic view 
0) Montagu 1962, ix and 326. 
is) Ic:ens 1967, 243. 
ii) Originally in Plautus, Asinavia 2.4.88 (sometimes falsely ascribed to 
Hobbed). In justice to the wolf it must be added, however, that he is among 
the animaII provided with the most trustworthy inhibitive instinct against 
killing their own kind - probably because without this instinct wolves, 
being capable of killing one another easily with one quick bite to the jugular 
vein, could have extarminated their species long since. It is indeed suggested 
by ethology (cf. Lo-ens 1967, 232-233) that mai , not possessing the natural 
physical ability to kill a~ other man easily and efficiently, has not developed 
that inhibitioo - and therefore, having invented the extra-corporeal means 
to do a better job of it, does in fact kill his fellows. (To ease his conscience he 
alsoinvented war.) 
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that man is a victim of his low instincts from which he cannot 
scape; indeed this would be, as I remarked earlier, a mere pendant, 
equally absolute a.nd extravagant, to Rousseau’s notion of man’s 
innate goodness. Surely the behaviorist, so ready tc absolve man 
from responsibility for his vices, cannot begrudge the ethologist’s 
disposition to liberate man from pretention to some of his virtues. 
Some opponents of the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution insisted 
that divine creation and divine intervention were responsible for 
man’s nature. To regard man as an animal, even as the most highly 
developed, rather than as God’s crowning creation and masterpiece 
of the Sixth Day, appeared as an intolerable abomination to the 
established faiths (as had, three-hundred years earlier, Galileo’s 
thesis that the earth, and with it man, was not the center and the 
glory of the whole universe). Thus the theory of evolutionary 
continuity moving upward from the amoeba to man was, and still is, 
abhorred by some. To them it is not enough that man is the most 
intelligent and (at least so far) the most advanced living thing on 
earth; they want him also to be separated from all other creatures 
by a chasm that no one dare bridge. It cannot be gainsaid that in 
the field of behaviour and ethrcs, in the domain of psychology and 
Fhilosophy, there doa~ yawn such a gap, another, albeit non- 
bioiogical, discontinuity between non-man and man: it is the 
complacent convictifon that man, unlike other living things, acts in 
reaction to his s.uroundings only and is totally free of any inherent, 
programmed pattern of behavior. It seems ironical thzt the modem 
theory of culture as the exclusive agent of man’s behavior should 
run parallel to the antique belief in special divine creation a5 the 
exclusive agent of man’s existence. A strange bedfellowship, 
indeed.12) 
Man’s ancient necessity to live in societies has, according to 
ethology, implanted in him over the millennia that social part of his 
behavior which is now innate, and which is implemented in his 
12) Cf. Hallowell 1956, 91: ‘Whereas opponents of human evolution in the 
tin+. tenth century were those who naturally stressed evidence that implied 
discontinuity between man and his primate precursors, anthropologists of 
the twentieth century, while still giving lip service to morphological evolution, 
%ve by the special emphasis laid upon culture as the prime human differ- 
ential, implied what is in effect an nnbridged behavioral gap between 
ourselves and our closest relatives’. 
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structured systems vf customs which we speak of severally as 
cultures. Indeed without the benefit of these social instincts we 
should not have become what we are: ‘If it were not for a rich 
endowment of social instincts, man could never have risen above the 
animal world. All specifically human faculties, the power of speech 
[N.B.], cultural tradition, moral responsibility could have evolved 
only in a being which, before the very dawn of conceptual thinking, 
lived in well-organized communitiest.la) Nor could man have 
endured if he merely possessed but did not also desire, cherish, and 
were even wiliing to defend his culture: ‘Without the phylogeneti- 
tally programmed love for traditional custom, human society would 
lack the supporting apparatus to which it owes its indispensable 
structure’.r4) Ye:. customs and cultures, we know, are bound to 
change, their iac k of endurance in human societies being as typical 
of them as is their very existence. From this arises the eternal 
contest between nreservation and innovation in all human behavior. 
including language: unbridled change would lead to chaos and self- 
defeat, and deprive man of the social structure without which he, 
being the cultural animal he is, cannot 1ast;ls) stagnation, on the 
other hand, and cultural petrifaction represent the other extreme, 
which man, being the brained animal he is, cannot tolerate. But 
there is no promise, and no evidence, that all cultural change is 
progress, on-whatever scale it is measured. Certainly the records of 
human speech, extending as they do over but a minute fraction of 
man’s existence, contain no trace of progress in the sense that man 
has derived advantage from all the structural changes attested in 
all the languages we know. 
If the capacity to possess and to change cultunl and social 
patterns is part of man’s phylogenetic heritage, so is of course his 
capacity to learn about them, and, implicitly, about himself. In 
fact the desire to obtain knowledge and to be guided by it, and by 
reason, is also typical of man - no matter how short his performance 
may fall of his wishes and ideals. If these drives were not phylo- 
'3) Lorem 1967. 238. 
14) Lmenz 1967, 250. 
1s) Cf. Ardrey 1967, 88: ‘Through his social mechanism the primate 
[including man] has made sure that he will get the greatest return from his 
own superior endowment, the brain; and Mfer the least disadvantage from 
his inherent vulnerability. the all-around weakness of his body’. 
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genetically programmed, or instinctive, what would impel man, 
unlike every other animal, to want to ‘know’ anything at all? 
Clearly, instinctual impulses and learned behavior collaborate, as 
already noted, and form ‘the working structure of the instinctive 
and culturally acquired patterns of behavior which make up the 
social life of man’, resulting iu ‘one of the most compl-cated systems 
we know on this earth’.rs) It is trovious (and more wiG be said about 
this later) thitt man’s learning and knowing, and of cour~,i: teaching, 
are intimately connlected with his capability to U=P_ ianguage. 
Primates come by their supenor brain through an evolutionary 
process. This is saying no more than that by way of natural selectios 
those individuals who were better equipped to deal with the 
requirements and opportunities thrust upon them were mo:e likely 
to survive, and thus could pass on their superior qualities to their 
descendants, and thence to populations and the spec+s.l7) We do 
not know what external conditions may have led %I the evolution 
of the brain in the primates. It has been suggested that the latest 
geological age, the Pleistocene, beginning over a million years ago 
and embracing four glaciations and climatic fluctuations oscillating 
between severe drought and great moisture, may have presented 
such challenges to pre-man and early man ac to favor the survival 
and propagation, thruugh thousands of generations, of those best 
equipped to cope with the environment, and thus led to the evolu- 
tion and spread among the species of an increasingly powerful 
brain. 
Man is, then, by instinct (and I now use the word in the ethological 
1s) Lorenz 1967, xi. 
1’) All this does of course not betoken a return to the Lamarckian notion 
of the inheritability of acquired characteristics, remarkable ia its day 
(around 1800) for implying the thesis of evolution, which m fact inspired 
Darwin to further inquiries and eventually led him to Lamar&s refutation. 
Natural selection in the Darwinian sense merely concentrates and enhances 
inheritable characteristics, but it does not produce new ones. Only mutation 
can do that - and of it Darwin knew nothing, even though his genius left 
space for it in his theory. We can now fill this void, for it seems that the 
cause of mutation is radiation, whether from an X-ray machine or from outer 
space. Exposure to radiation may - hut does not necessarily, indeed does 
rarely - affect a gene in a reproductive cell, and with it - far more often than 
not calamitously, with a counter-evolutionary effect - the entire descendant 
organism. 
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sense of innate programming) a social creature, possessing also 
various other phylogenetically evoived and inherited behavioral 
traits. He is furthermore endowed with the instinctive desire and a 
high capacity to learn, a gift that in turn is immeasureably enhanced 
by the efficiency and the pote.ncy of his brain and his general 
neurosensory constitution. In man the domain of instinct is, more 
than in other animals, controlled and tempered by what he has 
been able to learn through his intellectual power. ‘With the higher 
evolution of an animal species, the 4gnificance of the role played by 
individual experience and ieaming generally increases, while innate 
behavior, though not losing importance, becomes reduced to 
simpler though not less numerous elements’.ls) Consequently there 
is no reason to regard instinct and learning as forces necessarily and 
forever at loggerheads, with our tragic selves the battleground of 
their discords. Instincts may be open, that is, may be channelled 
and regulated, often restrained, though not eradicated; they may 
be complemented by acquired behavior. Hence Ardrey remarks 
rightly that ‘it is a paradox ot sorts that one who defends the 
primacy of the instinct in the iransactions of man finds himself 
defending the primacy of mind as well’, ar:d also defending ‘the 
quality of human mind that in the end will complete the innate 
patterns’.m) And far from seeing man as the victim of his animal 
instincts, Lorenz concludes his book cn aggression, the instinct 
that he finds pervasive in our human constitution, by saying: ‘I 
believe in the power of human reason, as I believe in the power of 
natural selection. ! b&eve that reason 
in the right direction’.se) 
will exert a selection pressure 
What htlps man above all in being a learning - and teaching - 
animal is the possession of speech. Through the intermediacy of 
language, and especially through the recent art of the durable 
encoding of language in writing, the single individual can be 
instructed, not just by the actual events that envelop him, but by 
the spoken and written reports about them. He may thus profit 
from the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of his society and his 
species, and this accumulation h:* been growing at an ever in- 
creasing rate of speed. The individual’s personal experience will 
more often than not be vicarious. Conversely, the non-speaking 
18) L-mew 1967, 42. 1s) Ardrey 1968, 2’56, 266-267. 
10) Lorenz 1%7,290. 
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animal depends fo,: quick and effective response to his surroundings 
largely upon this instincts, which or.e may therefo-e properly call 
the inherited wisdom, as distinct from tie acquired one, of the 
species. What an animal learns from another by precept and 
example is vu-y little at hcst.21) The task before us now is to 
examme the place of human speech artd language in the network 
of the innate and acquired beha ior patterns of man. 
There can be no doubt that linguistics, especially American 
linguistics of the 1930’s, and 1940’s w&s strongly oriented toward, 
indeed under the tutelage of, behaviorism. It has remained SO 
in many respects, even though psychology Itself has turned a$ 
from pure behaviorism, or at least modified it considerably.22) The 
21) That the swan parents teach the cygnets how to 3wim is an appealingly 
sentrmental but nonsensical anthropomorphic notion; a newly hatched 
cygnet will swim if thrown into the water, even if he has never before in his 
life Seen another sw%n, or water. Some say that a human baby will do the 
same; if so, th- first thing he learns as he grows is not swimming but drow- 
ning. It has &o been reported that the innate faculty of the homing pigeon 
to orient himself and to navigate, as distinguished from his lsa.rning to fly a 
path over an area that through practice becomes familiar to him, was greater 
m the ‘aexperienced than in the experienced bid, as if learning initially 
confucad rather than aided him. (Cf. the experimtnts by G. V. Y. Matthews. 
reported in Ardrey 1968, 126-127.) Simiiarly, experiments (also reported in 
Ar&ey 1968, 122-123) by 0. J. and A. Murie with deer mice, tiny animals 
that normally do not stray farther from their habitat than fifty yards, with a 
maximum of hundred yards in a lifetime, show not only that they were able 
to find their way to the nest if captu:c-l and released a mile Tom home, but 
also that subadults were better travelers than their experienced elders; and 
a young female, about five weeks old, performed best of all, finding her way 
to the nest over a distance of two miles. 
2s) it sometimes hoppens that a hypothesis or a theory, though having 
become partly or wholly ohsokrte among the scholars it immediately~concerns. 
lives on in a neighboring field. Ti 5 borrowers, havingfound it usable, but not 
being able to view it critically, and possibly not aware of its obsolescence. 
continue to adhere to the theory because it delivers rest&s that appear 
useful, at least on the surface, though they may be fundamentally quite 
unsound or senseless. .). good example of such delayed rek ction is offered by 
glottochronology, or lexicostatistics (a method, as some will remember, for 
dating the age r f a language - whatever that might mean! - based on the 
indefensible premise that the lexicon of all languages undergoes changes 
always at the same crte of speed); long since abaudoned by linguists (cf. 
Bolinger 1558a. 132-133), it is still employed by cntbropologists (most 
recently by Farb 1568, W-235, in a popularizing book). 
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formulas 31 . . . s + R, illustrating the progression from external 
stimulus S to the speaker’s linguistic reaction r that becomes the 
hearer’s auditory stimulus s, to the final R which is the hearer’s 
reaction, with r . . . s constituting the linguistic event itself, 
represents sheer behaviorism.23) It schematizes ‘reaction mediated 
by speech’, one of ‘the two human ways of responding to a stimu- 
lus’, the other being S -+ R, the ‘speechless reaction’.e4) The 
linguist is enjoined to concern himself solely wit’n the linguistic 
portion of the scheme, the linguistic reacticn of the speaker to a 
stimulus, and the resultant liaguistrc stimulus that reaches t!le 
herarer.26) The direct consequence of this attitude was the banish- 
ment from linguistics of whatever occurred in or motivated the 
speaker (S) and the hearer (R), whatever went on in or was con- 
tributed by their thinking (‘mentalism’ was the anathema hurled 
against all offenders, and ‘mind’ became a four-letter word), 
including the semantic content of the message (‘meaning’ was 
relegated to a m&linguistic limbo, and languages were analyzed 
without reference to it - at least in thenry, a-tile in practice the 
‘shortcut’ afforded by the inclusion of meaning was almost invaria- 
bly employed). The retributive irony was that strict adherence to 
the psychological doctrine of behaviorism in linguistics proscribed 
a.3 concerns with psychology. As a matter of fact, behaviorism was 
to Bloomfield and his successors not just a psychological theory but 
the very embodiment, the essence of the scientific method itself. 
It was upon it that linguistics had to be founded if it was to be a 
science. The t-ouble was that linguistics was thus made to put on 
all the trappings of a natural science, even though it cannot but be 
regarded as a social science for the most part.26) (Curiously enough, 
that portion of ianguage intercourse which is open to inquiry by 
means of the natural sciences - articuiatory and acoustic phonetics - 
2s) Cf. Bloomfield 1933, 24-26. 
24) Blcomfield 1933. 26. 
2s) Rloomfield 1926, 153 and 154, in an article one might regard as his 
linguistic credo, refers explicitly to the work of the behaviorist psychologist 
Weiss. (At the time, Bloomfield and Weiss were colleagues at Ohio State 
University.) Cf. also Weiss 1925 (in the first volume of the journal Lungztagc!) 
and 1929. 
2”) Cf. P&ram 1967, 
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’ was also declared to he o:rt&e o f linguistics by those most intent 
upon aligning linguistics with tf e natural sciences.) ‘The tendency 
of social scientists to whore after theories drawn from natural 
science - physical or biological - has a long history. Something has 
been gained, but the mass of consequent errcr suggests that the 
price may well have been too high.‘“‘) 
MIJT intent is of course not to beli’ctle tte Bloomfieldian and other 
behaviorist sch&s, ;; is cheap to contemn those upon whose 
shoulders one stands. Indeed the behaviorist and positivist type of 
linguistics was a justifiable and not a% all senseleqs, although in part 
exaggerated, reaction against the often non-scientific and sometimes 
altogether fanciful endeavors of earlier, purely mentalisric linguist- 
ics.28) But the mentalistic damage had been done, not because one 
assumed the exertions of a. mind (or will, or spirit), for there can be 
no denying that there is some power at work which sc:s the physical 
mechanism in motion, regardless of what we call it and regardless 
of our ability to perceive it as an organ or an event and to locate it 
somewhere in the physical body; the damage h;ud beeir done 
because mentalists thought that they had explairied something 
merely by into;dng some words, as if incantation and onomancy 
could solve a PI oblem. Eut clearly the contrary, the denial of the 
‘mind’, or of whatever one wishes to call it, in the mechanistic, 
positivistic way is no solution either.29) Difficulties do not go away 
just by our pretending that they are not there. ‘One must not 
believe that by saying “snblaryngeal activity” instead of “ideas” 
progress has been made; indeed the mentalistic termin+ogy is 
tcday certainly the most adequate (and in many cases the only 
2’) McRae 1958, 298. 
28) Cf. Bloomfield 1933, 142, and 32-33, respectively: ‘For the ment>alist, 
language is the expression of ideas, feelings, or volitions. The mechanist . . . 
believes that mental images, feelings, and the like are merely r)opular terms 
for various bodily movements . . . ’ ‘The mentalistic theory . . . supposes 
tbat the variability of human ccrnduct is due to ‘&e interference of some non-. 
physical factor, a spirit, or will, or mind , . . that is present in every human 
being . . . The materialistic (or, better, mechanistic) thecq supposes that the 
variability of human conduct, including speech, is due only to the fact that 
the human body is a very complex system.’ 
2s) On mentalism, anti-mentaliim, and iurti-anti-mentalism see F’ulgram 
1%7,76-84. 
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possible one) for numerous questions that the linguir,t must face. 
The query that one must put is this: how far does one get, today, 
by conductmg linguistic analyses rigorously in terms of stimulus 
and reaction? The a.nswer is that, in present conditions, one not 
only does not get far, but one does not move at all, one cannot even 
begin the description’.sa) Hence the irue and indisputable achieve- 
ment of Bloomfield’s and Bloomfieldian linguistics consists ‘not so 
much in advocating abstract methodological principles, as in 
presenting a rigorously and coherently formal rather than psycho- 
logical description of grammatical facts’.sl) 
I3y now, however, we have entered upon a period of 1inguLatic 
theory that reacts strongly against structuralist positivism. And I 
shall suggest that in the refutation of structural&m by transfor- 
mation grammar there is implicit not only the rejection, long 
overdue, of behaviorism in linguistics, but also a veering toward 
notions reminiscent of etholcgy. But since to my knowledge no 
transformationist linguist has explicitly referred to ethology, the 
convergence, albeit asymptotic rather than complete, is all the more 
interesting. 
If one were to seek the structurahst roots of transformation gram- 
mar, one would be likely to come, not upon Bloomfield, but upon 
his sensitive and wise cozrtemporary, Sapir; for it was Sapir who 
kept himself free from the excessive and sometimes crippling rigor 
which the Bloomfieldians chose to impose upon themselves.32) Of 
course, trausfonnation grammar, as envisaged by its founder, 
Chomsky, does not return, any more than does Sapir, to the vague 
idealism and mentalism of the late‘nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Instead, it proposes an analysis baaed upon a system of 
ordered rules. These rules, however, do not emerge from a be- 
havioristic source of reflexes and reactions, but rather from inborn 
notions of grammaticality, from an ‘intuition’ on the part of the 
speaker as to what is grammatical, or ‘well-formed’.*a) Thus the 
30) Lepschy 1966, 108-109. (My translatioa from Italian. An English 
translation of the entire book is forthcoming.) See also Schlauch 19%; 
Alkon 1959; Katz 1964. 
ai) Lepschy 1966, 111. (Idy tr~oslation.) Cf. also pulgram 1967. “g-81. 
$3) See Sapir 1921. 
a*) Well-formedness, or gramrnaticaluess, or indeed correctness ia a 
somewhat elastic criterion, ai are all criteria of social behavior. Both structnr- 
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user of language is in possession of some faculty, of a ‘competence’, 
whose nature is not discoverable from the mere examination of his 
utterances, his ‘performance’. To be sure, competence ;S attested 
by, and judgeable only through, performance; but is does not 
follow tLat the two are identical. Nor does it follow that the de- 
scription of the competence must precede the description of the 
performance. (LI : he ensuing discussion I shall refer only to those 
principles and aspects of transformation grammar that have a 
bearing on my topc; no total endorsement need be inferred.) 
Of crucial importance here is the concept of intuition. It is, or at 
least used to be, asserted by transformationist grammarians that 
the user of a language is informed by intuition, thar he ‘intuits’, 
whether an utterance is or is not grammatical. Whether it is said 
that all or a portion of language is innately specified, whether it is 
said that every user of a language functions in obeisance to innate 
ideas about his language - whatever the wording or the temrinology, 
one is inescapably led to think of some inherited predisposition 
situated somewhere inside the user of the language. For example, 
alists and transfommtionists err, it seems to me, in their views of this concept. 
If structuralists maintain th;t hs a‘,’ is not ungrammatical, they are of 
course right; but they ought to add that it belongs to a grammaticalness 
orher than that of Standard English. Saying that everything that can be 
said in ‘English’ is ipso facto grammatical, overlooks the fact that there is no 
such thing as a grammar of ‘English’ but only various @‘ammars of all 
kiids of dialects which may be subsumed under the name English, and that 
a single grammar and a single grammaticahmss can refer but to one of them 
at a time. Transformationists, on the other hand, who declare that, for 
example, I tea&d John lo go and John wunted me io go are well-formed, but 
that I wulrtcd me lo go is not (so Bach 1964. 8). employ an indefensibly 
narrow criterion of well-formedness. Apparently &e last phrase, which is 
surely well-formed on the phonological, morphological, syntactical, and 
lexical Ievels, is rejected because it is semantically not well-formed, or 
sensoh.‘= , or at least exceedingly odd. But if one leaves the most pedestrian 
and uuim~ginative uses of language, it not onli makes good sense but may 
even be of some stylistic us&: ‘I wanted me to go, but my body did not 
obey my will and I remained rooted to the spot.’ (The following sentence 
occurs m Bach 1964, 186, and is no doubt considered grammatical by its 
author: ‘Whether one arrives at a hy@lmsia by sifting v& amounts of 
material or whether it pops into ens’s head while shaving is nrelevaut.’ Yet 
it clearly alleges, by its grammatical structure, that the _oppillg hypothesis 
is shaving.) See also Bolinger 1966b. aud the remarks or the famous 
colorless gvcc~ idsas Sk+ jurrouj?t ‘%I T~lgram 1969. 
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ii it is revealed to the speaker by intuition that in John is easy to 
#ease somehow Jo& is the object, where% Jolm is the subject in 
Join is eager to @case; if intuition tells him tha: f&nc #laws ca@ be 
dalzgwous is but the surface expression of two underlying structures 
that can be rendered as to fly plaltes calt be dangerous and plaltcs 
that fly ca@ be dangerous : then intuition refers to something that the 
user of language has not learned but possesses innately. I can 
conceive, of no other good reason for the use of the word intuition in 
these circumstances (and I need not assume that there is a bad 
reason, say, mere sloppiness, in that intuition just stands for 
experience, or knowledgej.34) Indeed 1 take it that intuition was 
employed in explicit protest against the behaviorist view that the 
use of language is mastered by mere imitating, or analogizing, or 
acquiring of habits and reflexes, or by differential reinforcing of the 
child’s verbal responses by adults, etc. ; in other words, I take it that 
the use of ‘intuition’ affirms that the learning of grammar has 
something to do with man’s innate capacity to use a grammar so as 
to generate we&formed utterances. It is in particular the astonishing 
capability of young children to attain mastery of their native 
language, or even to learn concurrently a second language, that 
speaks against the purely intellectual, non-intuitive process of 
acquisition : for children succeed in a very short time in this task of 
extraordinary difficuky, for which their powers of intellect alone are 
surely insufficient, acquitting themselves much better than dc 
adults intent upon the same chore later in life. (But it is scarcely 
right to conclude that at the age of six the child knows his native 
idiom completely. One never does - and I am speaking not just in 
terms of vocabulary.)s5) Childre? must possess (if I now may 
return to the terminology of ethology used earlier) an instinct that 
guides them. One cannot object to this assumption on the grounds 
that it is unscientific, especially if ethcbgy is sound, as I think it is. 
34) A critical reader of this article remarked that the transfoormationista’ 
‘intuition’ does not necessarily refer to itrndc knowledge but that, on the 
contrary, it normally means leumcd knowledge which is covert rather than 
overt, implicit rather than explicit. If that is so, then intuition is, I maintsin, 
a poor term, misunderstood by most. But in any event. m innate knowledge, 
a real intuition or instinc?, that is, an innate faculty is &ill needed to expkiin 
man’s capabiity to acquire speech. See below. 
96) Cf. Bolinger 1968a. 7. 
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But there arises a dilemma of some magnitude. An +ustinct is, by 
definition, species specific; but a language is not. The instinct that 
informs one cat how to miaow (and to miaovr rather than to bark) 
is the same that informs all o:.her cats; nothing needs to be learned, 
indeed nothing more can be learned, and the instinct is closed. 
Research has shown that the singing of birds is somewhat more 
complex in origin: some birds rordve zll their vocal signals by 
inheritance, others, whose instincts are more open in tnis respect, 
squire theirs at least m part thrcu,h learning.36) But whatever the 
manner of aquisition, all members of the same species sing alike, 
they all speak the same ‘language’, as it were. But the single species 
home sa$iens, or, if you will, hrmo loquews, speaks many different 
idioms. 
To account for this J . . *ety oi behavior through the notion that a 
child is born with an Lnglish clr a Chinese or some other specific 
language intution would be p-eposterous. Also untenable is the 
belief that a single intuition, or a single instinct, informs the 
speakers of all languages concerning grammaticality in their 
respective tongues: surely the term intuition would then be used 
in a very odd manner. Anotter hypothpsis would be that the 
universality of intuition expresses itself in an actual universality of 
grammar; but this will not do, for while it is true that a number of 
grammatical univers&s can be extruded, one cannot perceive 
anything like a uGrersar human grammar - except in thta sense 
that grammar i?self is a universal, that every ianguage must have 
a grammar, (It is significant, *my the way, that str*lcturahsm acted 
upon the overriding tenet. that languages -re dliferent, and that 
each constitutes a separate, unique, enclosed system not com- 
mensurable with others, while transformation grammar tends 
toward an emphasis on the similarity of all Ianguages.)er) The - _ 
ss) Cf. Ar&ey 1968, 24. 
37) Cf. Lepschy 1966, 176: ‘Chom&y prefers to speak of “Axate ideas”, 
or, as one eight translate the phrase in terms of the natural sciences, GS, 
hereditary predispositions: thfs at least urxlerscores the existence of an 
unsolved problem rather thau setting the problem aside under cover of a 
superficial scientific terminology which in reality explain nothing. More 
disturbing than this ‘5 ~E:tic” aspect is th* recourse {found ever more 
frequently among logicibns and recentIy some lmgukts) TV the requirement 
of the UNIVERSALITY of grammar.’ [My transkkion.) 
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conclusion seems justified that a species specific instinct is re- 
sponsible for whatever is species specific, and implicitly universal, in 
human language, but that the great variety of language activity 
expressed in many different languages and grammars must be laid 
to other causes. In a way this leads us back to the old laBgage - 
laltgue diLinction, but seen now from a different angle. In any 
event, it does appear to be of the greatest importance to keep 
-arefully apart the species specific innate faculty of speech, and its 
implementation in a given Lmguage. 
A recent and important publication in transformation grammar 
has in fact come to the same conclusion as regards the meaning and 
the place of intuition - without using the word itself, possibly so as 
to dissociate the present authors from its earlier employment and 
connotations. Insiead, reference is made to ‘significant linguistic 
universals [which] are those that must be assumed to be available 
to the child learning a language as an a priori, innate endowment 
[N.B.]. That there must be a rich system of a priori properties - 
of essential linguistic universals-is fairly obvious fror: . the folk wing 
empirical observations. Every normal child acquires [N.B.] an 
extremely intricate and abstract grammar, the properties of which 
are much underdetermined by the available data. This takes place 
with great speed, under conditions that are far fro&m ideal, and there 
is little significant variation among children who may differ greatly 
in intelligence and experience. The search for essential linguistic 
universals is, in effect, the study of the a priori faculte de lar gage 
that makes language acquisition possible under the given con- 
ditions of time and access to data.‘ss) This is surely an explicit 
statement on the dichotomy of the innate (intuitive) faculty of 
speech and tne acquired knowledge of a language.39) It is elaborated 
ss) Chomsky-Halle 19613.4. 
ss) Langacker 1969, in a work obviously shsped by transformationist 
convictions, does not consistently keep the two apart, which leads to theo- 
retical vacillations and contradictions (Chapter IX, especially 233-240). It is 
said, for example, that according to the rationalist view (which the author 
adopts, rejecting the empiricist view) man has ‘language’ ‘innately specified 
almost in its entirety, which includes both the capacity for ‘language’ and 
most of the structure of ‘language’, aud that thus the role of learning is 
minimal; yet it is also said that the child does not genetically inherit a 
specific ‘language’ but only the capacity for ‘language’, and that he must 
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in the following statement: ‘In acquiring a language, a child does 
not memorize the utterances he hears; rather, be somehow utilizes 
those utterances to construct for himself a grammar, that is, a 
collection ci rules in accordance with which he can produce and 
understand an unlimited number of utterances, many of them 
new to hi- and not similar in any significant sense to those previ- 
ously encountered.‘40) 
Not dissimilar, though reached by an entirely different approach, 
is Lenneberg’s resonance theory of language ,Lcquisition, according 
to which the child reacts, to the language he bears like a resonator to 
sound.41) ‘ . . . the child’s hearing of French [results] in his speaking 
of French, each natural language being a selected frequency range 
that is capable of eliciting resonance.‘4s) Put thus boldly one may 
conclude that the &i&d does not really learn his language but 
somehow resonates to it - which of course raises the question 
whether he somehow aiready has French in him, which is made to 
resonate by his hearing :t from his environment; and that does 
seem somewhat mystic a process.43) But if once more one dis- 
tinguishes, as Lenneberg himself appears to be doing, between the 
child’s ‘language readiness [which] is a state of latent language 
structure’ and ‘the unfolding of language [which] is a process of 
actualization in which late-it structure is transformed in realized 
structure’,44) or - as I should put it - between the faculty of speech 
and the learning of the language, then resonance means no more 
than the child’s innate state of attunement to those phenomena 
around him which are language, and of which he can acquire a 
learn that ‘language’ which is spoken aroii7.d him among aII Ixxsible human 
languages - a process in which learning surely cannot be minimal also. 
The confusion arises, I think, because the single ttirm ‘language’ is used 
sometimes with the meaning of both faculty of speech‘and a given idiom, and 
sometimes with either one or the other. If Langacker actually agrees with 
the Chomsky-HaIle view of duality. he certainly obscures verbally his 
opinion. 
40) Chomsky and HaUe 1968, 249. 
41) Lennebcg 1967. Chapter 9: Toward a biological theory of lan.guage 
development. 
42) Leuueherg 1967, 378. 
4s) Objections have been raised. Diller 1968, calls resonance a ‘disastrous 
metaphor’. But is not that the trouble with all metiphors in science ? 
M) Lennehrg 1967,376. 
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mastery thanks to this attunement. This interpretation seems to be 
borne out by the following words: ‘Notice that the resonance 
phenomenon in mar is actually an aspect of his peculiar and species 
specific ontogenetic [N.B.] hietory.‘4s) As regards the innate 
universals of lungage and the particulars of langue, these words 
apply: ‘. . . it is our “mode of calculating with categories” that is 
universal, but the categories themselves are not fixed nor the 
particular device of the many possible operations.‘*e) 
Let us now pursue this further, and examine in what way the 
theses of transfvrmation grammar converge with what one would 
have to say on the same subject in terms of ethology. 
A language is part and parcel of the social and cultural baggage 
which man acquires and czries with him through life, none of it 
recessarily in a stable, unalterable form. Though some cultural 
traits seem to be universal, they are not for that reason species 
specific, that is, an inherent property of the species. On the other 
hand, what is species specific is universal by implication, a fortiori - 
as is the case with the faculty of possessing, and behaving in 
accordance with, a culture. In other words, the single biological 
species oi man, characterized by the innate and therefore universal 
necessityy to have a culture, is subdivided into numerous and varied 
cultural, including linguistic, units. In these units one may discern 
certain universal but not species specific traits (for example, the 
wish to adorn oneself, the belief in extra-human, superhuman 
powers, etc.). 
‘Culturally developed social norms and rites are characteristic of 
smaller and larger human groups much in the same manner as 
inherited properties evolved in phyiogeny are characteristic of 
subspecies, spec’es, genera, and greater taxonomic units. Their his- 
tory can be reconstructed much by the same methods of comparative 
study. Their divergence in historical development erects barriers 
between cultural units in a similar way as divergent evolution does 
45) Lenneberg 1967,392. He 2lso refers specifically ti &imlokp: ‘Sonxtimes 
it is said that the general claim of epe& specificity of behavior or the 
postulation of innate factors that determine such behavior is a return to the 
preformist position of eighteenth-century developmen+d theory. Nothing 
could be farther from the truth. Modern ethology is as @genetic as embry- 
ology itself if2 today.’ 
‘6) Lemleberg 1967,377. 
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between species; Erik Erikson hai therefore aptly alled this process 
pseudo+peciation.‘47) This is of course predicated upon man’s 
urge to become a member of a group ox of a society langer than the 
family unit, which ‘is certainly something that has been pro- 
grammed into the prehuman phylogeny of mm’ ; but since mt all of 
hum.anity has so far formed. a single society and behaved according 
to a single culture, it follows that ‘the distinctive prcgerties of any 
group which make it coherent and exclusive 
ritualiied in cultural development’.4*) 
are norms of behavior 
Now it is plain that the various languages are such ‘culturally 
developed norms . . . of behavior’ distinctive for various groups, 
and that therefore one may ascribe their origin, too, to a process of 
pseudo-speciation. They also share, despite their variety, certain 
universals, which again are not for that reason to be regarded as 
species specific in the sense of beng a portion of our human en- 
dowment (e.g., the presence in a message cd limitable and extracta- 
ble units of sound and form) ;4s) but the species specific faculty of 
speech is, again, implicitly a universal. The Chomsky-PTalle state- 
ment to the effect that ‘the search for essential linguistic universals 
i; . . . the study of the a priori faculte de langage that makes 
language acquisition possible’ (quoted above, p. 326), ought therefore 
to be amended in the sense that some universals, nameiy, those 
traits that are coincidentally present in all language, are not for 
that reason a part of the faculty of speech.ss) In fact, what most 
linguists have called ‘language universals’ are precisely of that kind, 
rather than of the kind provided by the innate faculty of speech.51) 
47) L0ren.z 1967, 76. 
46) Lorenz 1967,256. 
4s) It is worth noting here that human utterances of the mood-signaling 
rather than of the information-symbolizing variety, generally referred to as 
non-articulate (laughing, gnmling, screaming, whimpering, crying, etc.), 
are also universals - perhaps species specific: it will be difficult to draw the 
line here as long as we do not study these noises and det~rmins whether or 
not they are instinctive. 
se) Sea above, fn. 36, Lepschy’s remarks on the universality of grammar. 
sr) Seizer and Ohnsted 1969.62 quote the following passage from McNeill 
1966,46-47: ‘Suppose a child has these basic concepts @iguistic universals] 
as part of his biological endowment. Suppose that he knows, for example, 
what the relation is between verb and object . . . By assigning the basic 
grammatical relations a place in the child’s innate linguistic endowment, we 
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17dc_J I am wondering whether at rhe present stage of the biological 
sciences we have any means of studying the faculty of speech 
beyond merely postulating its presence. 
All this being so, the faculty of speech, part of our speciation and 
not of cur cultural pseudo-speciation, cannot inform a user of 
ianguag: on the grammaticality’ of a given utterance in a given 
language, but only concerning s,;ecies specific, universal properties 
the most notable among whch is of course the fa,,.t that all 
languages are systematic and structured. In other words, as human 
beings we have the innate power of comprehending and producing 
at will utterances that are ‘grammatical’. 
If a person is in somre manner prevented from learning a language 
he remains dumb - that is, language-less, not speech-less, for his 
innate faculty of speech continues to reside iSi him, waiting tc be 
activated by circumstances favorable to learning. Nor can the 
faculty of speech be bred out of man: it is quite certain that if 
several generations were prevented from acquiring a language (an 
experiment that is of course unfeasible in a civilized society,, the 
first generation exposed to a language would immediately respond 
by learning it -- exactly as the captive weaverbirds resumed their 
nest-buSding. 
Man i I innately a social and cultural animal, but lives in socially 
and cu!turally distinct societies; he is innately a speaking animal 
but he lives in linguistically distinct societies. ‘In other words, 
man’s u hole system of innate activities a& reactions is phylo- 
genetically so constructed, so ‘calculated’ by evolution, as to need 
to be complemented by cultural traditions.52) For instance, all the 
tremendous neurosensory apparatus of human speech is phylo- 
genetically evolved, but so constructed that its function Fresupposes 
assume them to be universal . . . Thus a child who knew them could com- 
mence acquiring any natural language by striving to discover how each of 
these relations is expressed locally.’ To this Peiser and Olmstead rep!y 
(42-G) : ‘Snce linguistic “universals” are at present suggested by study of a 
small samz:le oi the world’s three or four thousand languages, any theory that 
depends heavily upon such universals is likel_ to be overturned by exceptions, 
unless the categories or relations taken to be unfversal are defined so vaguely 
as to eccount for little of linguistic interest.’ To ‘vaguely’ one may add 
‘trivially’, 
62) I belreve ‘implemented would be a better term here. (Footnote added.) 
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the existence of a culturally developed language, which the infant 
has to learn’ss) Hence one need nor deny the validity of the concept 
of intuition as suggested in some transformation grammars in 
opposition to an anti-mentalistic strain of siructuralism ; but one 
must place it on the level of the faculty of speech rather than on 
that of language. The intuition endows man, not with grammati- 
cality, but with the capacity to judge grammaticality. ‘. , . thexe is 
no reason for genetic emphasis to deflect attertion from the system- 
atic study ot the learning process. In particular, it is 1ogicaUy 
possible that grammar be learned, even if the mechanism underlying 
yercep,ion of relations have a strong innate component.‘s4) The 
SPI;I~ authors go on to say that ‘it is not logically necessary that a 
theory of language acquisition involve andysis mechanisms, or 
behavior-contingent mechanisms, but not both’. In a footnote they 
then cite Putnam 1966: ‘. . invoking “innateness” only postpones 
the problem of learning; it does not solve it.‘ss) 
Speech and language are evolution’s Lrtest, and so far most 
successful, device in the sercrice of animal communication. Others 
are sure to follow - though at the usual slow evOhti97laI'y speed, 
and most likely reserved for a species other, and more advanced, 
than Itomo loytie~s. But now we come face to face with a puzzling 
question. If as human beings we are instinctively endouTed with the 
faculty to learn a language, then why, it wrll be asked, does this 
faculty operate so effectively and successfully only during child- 
hood, when we learn our so-called native languagf;, but so thoroughly 
forsakes us when we want to acquire a foreign !angGage later in life? 
Second-language learning is a difficult chore at best, and in one 
“*) Lorenz 1967, 256. 
64) Peizer and Olmsted 1969, 63. Note that under &be heading ‘Ideal 
specifications for a grammar-karning device’ Peizer and Olmsted state 
among other reqnircmcmts *&at ‘the device should not assun’e grammar to 
begin witb: substantive grammatical c&ego&- 2-d relation: are mt part 
of the innate endowment of tba device’ (65). Further on, nnd:r the heading 
‘Assumptions and spscies-independent [as opposed tc species-specific] 
abilities’, they list certain capabilities that play a part in language per- 
formance but that are not the property of man alone: ‘Ttese, in short, are 
some [six i.1 all] of the important abilities we assums are not unique to Homo 
sapiens’ [66). In other words, a ox&in capabilit)r used Ior speech may be 
innate, hence universal. but not species specific to map. 
“9 Peizer and Olmsted 1969, 64, witb footnote 1. 
332 ERNST PULGRAM 
raspect virtually an impossible ooze in that few adult learners ever 
attain a complete, ‘native’ mastery of a second language on the 
phonological level (the ‘foreign accent’ clings to most of us even 
under the best environmental circumstances). Can it be that we are 
guided by instinct in the acquisition of a language only when we 
are children, and that thereafter the extremely difficult task 
devolves exclus’vely, or to a much greater extent, upon our intel- 
iect? That is to say, does instinct in second-Ianguage learning, even 
though it still endows us with the necessary predisposition to learn 
a language at all, no longer guide us safely and efficiently as it did 
in first-language learning? Is second-language learning more akin 
to our learning of, say, mathematics or chemistry or carpentry? 
These are extraordinarily complex questions, concerned basica.lly 
with a theory of learning - and unfortunately no satisfactory such 
theory is available at this moment. They are probably going to 
yield only to the combined endeavors of several sciences of both the 
biological and the psychological domains. In particular, we i;hall 
have to find out just what physical evems and changes in the Lady 
are associated with what psychological ones in the process of 
learning, and with the retention by memory of what has been 
learned. A century after Gregor Mendel’s experiments leading to 
the discovery of the basic laws of heredity, the actual agents in 
the process - genes, chromosomes, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 
ribonucleic acid (RNA) - were finally discovered; some day we may 
find the agents similarly involved in learning and memory. But 
despite our ignorance of matters physical in this realm, it may be 
use&l and instructive to examine the behavioral phenomena, znd 
in particular to apply the ethological view of speech and language 
to language learning. 
I have mentioned earlier (see above, fn. 21) that in some instances 
the instinctive behavior of animals appears not to be improved but, 
or the contrary, injured by after-childhood experience. One ic 
tempted to conclude that instinct exerts its potency with greatest 
efficiency where leaming and experience channels are not yet 
functioning - when in fact for that very reason instinct is most 
needed to inform the animal on how to behave. It seems not 
unreasonable, then, to surmise that at the time when the human 
child must learn his language, yet does not possess the necessary 
mental equipment and experience to cope with the task, instinct 
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is ready to operatees) And that is a good reason why the learning 
of the first language appears virtually the equivalenr of, and 
congruent with, the unfolding of the faculty of speech itself, that is, 
?vhy we seem almost born with our first (‘native’) language, why 
we seem to have genetically inherited the language itself and not 
just the faculty of speech. And for the same reason the difficulty of 
learning a second language setnrns to increase with advancing age, 
runnng counter to the deve..opment of our mental faculties - 
precisely because we are in fact shedding the instinct and substitute 
intellectual for intuitive learning.57) 
Other deep-seated social and cultural norms, though they still 
may spring from the general source of innate instincts through 
pseudo-speciation, attain fixation at later times of one’s life. If the 
espousal of non-linguistic norms by the individual comes under the 
heading of object-fixation, may one not then speak of the infant’s 
acquisition of the native language, which is actually among the 
f:rst social norms of hin culture that the &iM acquires, as a process 
tf object-fixation alsr:’ Lorenv suggests this: ‘Apparently this 
Lrocess of object fixation can take its full effect only once in an 
individual’s life. Once the valuation of certain social norms or the 
allegiance to a certain cause is fully established, it cannot be 
erased again, at least not to the extent of making room for a new, 
equally strong one.‘s*) Is this the reason why learning a foreign 
language during adolescence or adulthcod is so difficult? Ts it 
possible that man’s object fixation on a first language during 
childhood preempts or exhausts his capability to learn a second 
language by the same process of object fixation, and that learning 
thereafter must proceed by intellectual, non-intuitive exertions? 5s) 
60) Cf. Lenneberg 1967, 378: ‘Once the critical period during which 
resonance may occur is outgrown, one language is fiimly established, and 
exposure to new ;mnd different natural languages is no longer resonated to’. 
(Here, too, the term ‘resonance’ must be understood with the reservations I 
mentioned earlier.) Concerning the firm establishment cf ‘one’ language, see 
the following paragraph. 
67) Recent experiments with learning during sleep, and research on the 
peculiar functions of REM (‘rapid eye movement’) sleep, seem also to 
suflgest that some learning may take place efficiently at a subliminal, non- 
thh ting level. 
s*) I.orenr 1967, 253459. Cf. fn. 53, above. 
ss) It should be noted that in speaking of ‘fit’ and ‘second’ language 
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Whatever Lorenz says on non-linguistic object-fixation is 
couched in hypothetical, if persuasive, tern >. As regards linguistic 
behavior, a parallel hypothesis is all sne may properly propose at 
this time; but plausibility and experience suggest that the truth 
may lie in that direction. 
Finally, we must not forget that language is the medium through 
which we learn virtually everything we need so as to be human, 
that is, to live in a society and to possess a culture. But in order 
even to begin to learn, we must become speaking creatures first of 
all. If therefore evolution has made us instinctive possessors of 
culture, it could not but make us atso instinctive and proficient 
learners of language in early infancy. Perhaps you detect a tinge 
of teleology in what I am saying; but nature and the universe 
confront us constantly and obdurately with a seeming purpose- 
fulness. Short of discovering in it the will of the divinity, we can 
only plead ignorance, or seek shelter in agnosticism - until we have 
learned better. 
But if there exists this vast difference between early and later 
language learning (or first language and second-language learning, 
as is generally said), one should think that the recognition of thr. 
fact has to be reflected in the pedagogy of second-language teaching, 
especially of the kind that occurs in post-infancy years, after the 
naturally most propitious time for it is past. Of course, it would be 
best if language learning were actually placed in the early years of 
lift, and thus removed from the university or even from secondary 
education altogether, and put where it belongs, into kindergarten 
and the nursery. But we are, it seems, a long piece from this happy 
condition, and even under the best of circumstances there will 
learning I am using the customary terminology that assumes that a child 
grows up a monolingual, as indeed the vast major59 of children do. But, as I 
noted earlier, a child can indeed acquire more than one ‘fist’ language, and 
the adult’s ‘second’ may therefore be in fact a third or eveu a fourth. (All 
the research on childhood polyglottism, on retention and oblivion of lan- 
guages beyond a principal one, is yet to be. done, as far as I know.) Hence 
object fixation upon a ‘first’ language, preemption and exhaustion of a 
language learning capability in the child, should be understood as referring, 
not to a physical limitation o- saturation occurring after the absorption of 
one single language, but rather co the passing of an age or maturity threshold 
beyond which language learning becomes a different performance. 
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always be a necessity to teach a foreign language to adolescents and 
to adults. Yet of late this kind of teaching, having come under the 
aegis of a linguistics excessively inspired by behaviorism, could not 
but ba cr&ted behavioristically, that is, proceed on the stimulus - 
response model. 
Under zealous and insistant behaviorist coaching, the conditioned 
reflex was regarded by many structuralists (but not by all; structur- 
alism must not be simply equated with behaviorism) as I he im- 
mediate and exclusive agent involved in first-language learning, as 
indeed in any kind of learning; and for second-language learning 
another process seemed to be even less suitable, a fortiori. I-Ience it 
was assumed that the student is best served if he is made to learn 
the second language exactly as he did, allegedly, the first, namely, 
by acquiring in the manner of the infant and the child conditioned 
reflexes. It should be observed that automatic reaction to linguistic 
stimuli was thereby not ocly made the goal of second-language 
instruction (and there is nothiug wrong with that) but also proposed 
as the method of instruction (and there is everything wrong with 
that). 
A pedagogue assures us solemnly that ‘the infant learns the knack 
of language through reinforcement of his Sehavior by those around 
him rather than by imitation’.se) (This declaration somehow 
manages to overlook that only such phenomena in the child’s vocal 
behavior as are in fact good imitations of adult language will be the 
object of reinforcement in the first place: continued gurgling and 
spluttering will not be reinforced, but mama and eat and tell me a 
story will.) As regards the role of instinct, or of a genetically pro- 
grammed faculty, the same pedagogue says: ‘Credit is due the 
behaviorists for ridding psychology of a great clutter of old wives’ 
tales about faculties, instincts, and the like’.sl) With this theoretical 
background on first-language learning, one will not be suprised to 
read that ‘the single paramount fact about [second-Ilanguage 
learning is that it concerns, not problem solving, but the formation 
so) Brooks 1964, xi. But see ‘5elow. fn. 64. 
61) Brooks 1964,47. Note the date, a% which the psychologists had already 
come to avoid the mechanistic approach of murow behaviorism, even though 
they did not, to be sure, return to the idealistic view which had tied psy- 
chology to philosophy for so long a time. I have remarked earlier (see above, 
fn. 22) on this type of lag in scholarship. 
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and performance of habits’, aod that ‘the ecqultion of non- 
thoughtful responses is the very ;ore of successful [second-Ilanguage 
learning . . .‘az) It is conceded that ‘given [the learner’s] psycho- 
logical and physiological development and the environment in 
which he fiads himself, it is unrealistic to suppose that second- 
language learning can be for him a mere repetition of the processes 
of learning the mother tongue’; 62;) but the implication is clearly that 
the reason for this is to be sought in the condition and the etlviron- 
ment of the iearner. ard not in the different nature of the learning 
process. 
The pedagogical key to the acquisition of these automatic 
language habits is, as everyone knows by now, pattern practice. 
‘Since every speaking person ha; mastered his own [firstj language 
through imitation and analogy and without the benefit of analysis, 
it stands to reason that something of this ability will aid him in the 
learning of another language. Pzttem practice permits this ability 
to function.‘s4) And pattern practice is defiled as ‘the learning of 
language structure through the repetition of utterances in which the 
patterns (of sound, order, form, and choice) either are identical or 
have only small and consistent differences. It makes the explanation 
of grammar largely unnecessary and encourages the function of 
analogy’.ss) And it is by analogy, rather than by analysis, ‘that we 
learn our mother tongue, and thu!; . . . we can make the best progress 
in a new language’.ss) 
Language teaching according to this design was in no small 
measure a reaction against the intolerable and fruitless practice of 
converting a language class into a lecture on grammar, often a 
grammar ill-devised with respect to both facts and arrangement of 
facts (and it is the undying merit of structnralism to have taught 
us how to design a grammar that most truthftiy and coherently 
reflects the formal structure of a given language). Rut the pendulum 
‘J*) Brooks 1%4,49 and 62. 
08) Brooks 1964.56. 
64) Brooks 1964, 147. Note that in. this passage 3nitation, having been 
explicitly rejected earlier (on p. xi; see above, fn. 60), is now admitted as an 
instrument of first-language learniqg. See. also Brooks 1964, 152-163, 
Cha&er i 1: Pattern practice. 
a) Brodks 1964, 275. 
66) Brooks 1964.263. 
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was s’vung too far over to the other side, and all talk about grammar 
was enthusiastically proscnbed, in the pions - but, as it turned out, 
unjuctifted and unfulfilled - hope that language could be taught in 
a mechan&l uay by creating habits and without explicit statement 
of rules. (As a matter of fact, since the fully orthodox exclusion of 
reference to grammar revealed itself to bc an unbearable constraint 
- after all, language is grammar - the term ‘gramar’ itself was 
exorcised and replaced by ‘structure’, on the disingenuous premise 
that grammar may not be taught but that structure may. Chassez 
le Izattirel. il revient au galop.) 
The basic fallacy in all this is th.e notion that language is but a set 
of ‘labits, or habitual behavior, and that the acquisition of some 
automated reflexes by means of pattern practice is equivalent to 
language learning.s7) This is curious enough a position; but it 
becomes untenabl;e when not only grammatical explanation but also 
reference to meaning - i.e., translation - is prohibited. Yet the idea 
that second-language learning should, or even can, be achieved 
without there taking place somehow, somewhere in the learner, a 
detoding of the foreign and re-encoding into the known language, 
strikes me as preposterous. 1 cannot help wondering what language 
or languages the pedagogue himself learned in that way, if he 
lear;\ed one at all. ‘The error lies of course again in the specious 
parallelism with first&anguage learning, where indeed no translation 
in the learning procp cs takes place. But this transference makes no 
sense, because just as first-language learning occurs necessarily 
upon a clean slate, from tab& rasa, so second-language learning 
occurs inescapably through tbe medium of the already known 
first-language.@) 
Ch thodoxy also requires that occupation with the written 
language, the reading and the writing of it, be delayed, on the 
unproven and improbable view, also due to equation of second- 
language with first-language learning, that only after having 
mastered some aural-oral proficiency is the student ‘ready’ to deal 
e7) 1 quite agree witi Chomsky and Halle 1968, 4, ‘that then: is . . . no 
sense of the term “ihatit” in which the normal use of language can be de- 
scribed as some kind of “habit system” or as “habithal behavior”‘. 
6s) Cf. &linger 1968a, 293. 
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with the written word, just as the + %ld learns to speak and bear 
first, and to read and write only later in school.sS) 
Language teachers are coming around to think that the results of 
this method (often called ‘linguistic method’, even though it is 
b*ced on just one peculiar aspect of one kind of linguistics, and 
generaIIy practiced by non-Iinguists in the first place) are dismal at 
best; in fact, many ‘reading courses’ and grammatical explanations 
are returning upon the scene. The members of an entrenched 
establishment of foreign language pedagogy (consisting nowadays 
in a large measure of persons daiming expertise in ‘applied linguist- 
ics’, an estate that, they seem to think in the customary manner of 
Educators in alI fields, absolves them from the onerous task of 
studying the subject, in this case linguistics, first) will no doubt 
dissent vociferously. But the opinion is coming to the fore that the 
teaching method aiming toward implanting conditioned reflexes 
and automatic habits is duIl, unrewarding, intellectually be- 
numbing - and ineffective.70) The cause of this failure lies, it seems 
6s) In my own language learning I have found any attempt to followfhis 
ordering of events an intolerable and stultifying hindrance. I quite agree with 
F’uccianl and Hamel 1967, 11: ‘The statement that language is spoken before 
it is written may have intellectual [i.e., chronological] validity; it is a 
pedagogical non-saquituur. . . That language as a general 11 xnan phenomenon 
is spoken before it is written is no reason why a student should lea? n to say 
le Ziu~e before he l~rns to write it.’ And again, 13: ‘The natural pr;macy of 
all spoken languagt tmer all written language is rbe linguist’s and anthro- 
pologist’s statement of fact, supported by his own professional al.tbority, 
which merely asserts that there never have been instances at any time of 
natural languages which were written before they were spoker. This is 
indisputably trne. Nonetheless it is a statement which contains i value 
for the classroom teacher.’ In fact, there is no practical evidence (I am 
ignoring here some contrived statistics) tbat the pedagogical primacy of the 
spoken, and neglect or delay of the written language has produced sig- 
nificantly better results +-ban equal participation of all skills, with emphasis 
on the student’s intellectual effort rather than reflexive reaction. And 
there is no evidence outside the theorist’s conviction that the learniug of 
dead 1anguageJ (a dead language beii one that is not native to any now 
living speaker), which one does not plan to use orally, is rendered easier and 
more efficient by means of the oral-aural approach. 
‘*) Sweet 1967, 145,llsts three assumptions upon which p&%)-n $&ice 
is baed, the last d them being that ‘language learning wxn&ts of $6rming 
hahts of automatic response rathei than slow and painful solution of/camp& 
cated problems’, which he himself had accepted and implemented in numer- 
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to me, in the short-circuiting of the adolescent and the adult 
student’s most valuable instrument for language learning, his brain 
(note the phrase ‘non-thoughtful response’ in a passage cited above, 
p. 336), on douJ_Ay fallacious grounds: one, that second-language 
learning proceeds in the same way as does first-language learning, 
and two, that first-language learning takes place through the 
formation of habits and conditioned reflexes. 
it seems that the lessons one can !esrn from ethology about 
human behavior have to be applied also to sec*ond-!zngaage learning. 
The post-infancy learner must be .r+rded as being genetically 
predisposed to be a user of a language by an innate capability for 
conceiving of ‘grammar’, and therefore as possessing the ability to 
learn a language, that is, to produce and understand grammatical 
utterances most of which he has never heard or made before. He 
achieves this skii somehow - we do not really know how - by 
1earnir.g or ‘internalizing’ grammatical rules; but we do know that 
he dots so in a manner different from that of the infant and child, 
for reasons plausibly and persuasively suggested by the ethological 
thesis that some behavior patterns are innate and undergo fixation 
early in life without, or before, apposite cerebral ac?ivity.71) Not 
ocs pedagogical works dealing with Latin. But he adds now in a footnote, 
with reference to his latest work, Arta Latinac, that ‘this assumption hss 
been nlodificd . . . It now appears that language learning is both automatic 
acquisition of habits and problem solving. If problem solving did not enter 
into the process, a speaker of a language would never be able to construct an 
utterance which be bad not heard before or indeed even to understand a new 
one. In learning to read and understand a sophisticated literature like Latin, 
problem solvfng is of great importance’. (Of ccurse, there is nothing peculiar 
about the Latin language or the Latin literature that wculd make problem 
solving in learniag it more important than in learning other languages, 
living or dead.) Pedagogues leas perspicacious and less well informed than 
Sweet ‘fill no doubt need a generation or two to cnme to the conclusion that 
problem solving - in language learning and in other fields - is not a painful 
or a discouraging experience to a human bei*% equipped with a brain. 
71) What Chomsky and Halle 1968,3, say about the fi=t language applies 
equally, excepting the manner of acquisition, to the second: ‘It is an im- 
portant fact, too often overlmked, that in normal, everyday discourse out 
unders+~ds and produces new utterances with no awareness of novelty or 
innovation, although these normal utterances are similar to those previous(y 
produced and encountered only in that they are formed and interpreted by 
the same grammar, the same interualfzed system of rules.’ This still does 
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being a pre-literate and inteL1ectually incomplete child, hence more 
reliant upon intellect than on instinct in language learning, the 
learner may and ought to haIre the rules presented as such, so that 
his proper grammatical behavior may consist in his applying these 
rules when he produces the appropriate sounds. The notion that 
this is regrettable heczse it is ‘problem cnl=+n’ rather than _“. . ,“& 
speaking I find ii *elevant, especialiy since the mastery of patterns 
through practice VI ithout problem solving does not lead to ‘speaking’ 
in any sense of ;he word. (As everyone knows, acceptable and 
successful pattern practice and pattern reproduction WX~ occur 
without the speaker’s comprehension of what he is saying - an 
impediment that, orthodoxy warns, must not be remedied Lj 
tra;&tion.) To be sure, a !earner may eventually attain automatic 
proficiency and fluency in a second language - through practice in 
hearing and speaking and re?.ding and writing discourse, but not 
through the bits and pieces of parrotted patterns. There are no 
bargains, dear to those who believe that learning must be ‘fun’, to 
be had. Although basic skills of performance, whether in speaking a 
foreign langzige or cutting wood or playing the violin, appear, and 
in part certainly are, reflexive and non-thoughtful (even though 
we do not know by what internal mechanism or chemistry they got 
that way) there is -o reason whatever to assume that the methods 
and processes leading to the acquisition of these skills must also 
incorporate reflexes and non-thoughtfulness * W!eG experience and 
experiments suggest the contrary conclusion. 
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